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ABSTRACT 
What degree of protection from potentially damaging maternal 
behavior should be awarded to an unborn fetus? This thesis 
examines the fetal environment as different conceptualizations 
of maternal responsibility. Focusing particularly on fetal 
alcohol syndrome (FAS) as a case study to examine existing legal 
precedents, it demonstrates how recent knowledge of the fetal 
environment contributes to the understanding of these decisions. 
More specifically, it analyzes the contributions of research 
on maternal responsibility and fetal rights to understand the 
dynamics of implementing fetal protection policy. Finally, 
this discussion illuminates theoretical issues regarding the 
nature of the relationship between individual rights, social 
responsibility, and legal regulation. 
-The rising controversy over fetal rights versus maternal 
rights has been unnecessarily limited to a debate on the moral 
legitimacy of abortion. This hides the more general discussion 
of legal and medical obligations to the unborn fetus because 
abortion, despite its popularity in the literature, represents 
only a small part of many complex medical avenues by which a 
maldeveloped fetus can be treated. Indeed, most recent fetal 
abuse lawsuits do not neatly fit in the right to life framework. 
It would make more sense if attention were focused instead on 
medical evidence, legal precedent and legislative policy which 
is likely to color the treatment of the other issues at hand. 
The concept of fetal rights as well as the dynamics 
surrounding its promotion are practical examples of issues raised 
by research in the current biological and medical sciences. 
The intent of this paper is to demonstrate that biomedical 
knowledge contributes significantly to the understanding of 
this major policy issue, and in turn, to show how that policy 
issue stimulates theoretical developments regarding the 
relationship between individual rights, social responsibility, 
and even legal regulation. 
The first part of this thesis reviews general knowledge 
about the fetal environment, and it identifies maternal 
consumption of alcohol as one among a number of threats to 
healthy fetal development. The second section examines the 
effect of maternal consumption of alcohol on the unborn, focusing 
particularly on the critical early stages of pregnancy. The 
third part casts fetal rights and maternal rights issues in 
.-
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terms of different conceptualizations of justice. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of prevention as a policy alternative 
to what already exists in legislation and legal precedent. 
A recent and rapid expansion in knowledge regarding the 
environment of the fetus has been accompanied by a reemergence 
of concern for the rights of the fetus to have as safe as 
possible a sanctuary in the womb. This, in turn, has led to 
questions regarding the mother's obligations to provide such 
an environment for the fetus. The assertion of maternal control 
over her body is being challenged by significant evidence that 
particular behavior of the mother's activities during pregnancy 
might endanger the life or health of the fetus. For Patricia 
King this "increasing awareness that a mother's activities during 
pregnancy may affect the health of the offspring creates pressing 
policy issues that raise possible conflicts among fetuses, 
mothers and researchers"(92). Although the scientific data 
are new, the idea that a pregnant mother intuitively takes on 
an obligation to provide a proper environment for the developing 
fetus is certainly not of recent origin. Plutarch for instance, 
stated "one drunkard begets another"; and Aristotle: "foolish, 
drunken or hare-brain women, most part bring forth children 
like unto themselves, morosos et languidos"(Blank, Life, 63). 
To what extent should society take an active role to ensure 
a proper fetal environment? Aristotle proposed strict state 
control over breeding and the conditions of pregnancy to back 
up his concern for the new generation of citizens(Blank, Life, 
63). Given the traditional emphasis on prenatal privacy in 
reproductive matters, the American legislatures and courts have 
avoided this dilemma to date by refusing generally to intervene. 
The landmark Roe vs. Wade, therefore, offered no guidance 
whatsoever for resolving conflicts of interests where a motherts 
treatment of her own body might cause harm to the unborn child. 
However, many woman have been indicted for child abuse for giving 
birth to children addicted to drugs(Chambers, A1). More such 
rulings are expected as the precision of knowledge of fetal 
environmental damage increases. Also, torts for wrongful life 
might presumably include action against a mother for damage 
negligently inflicted upon the fetus while in utero. 
Recent innovations and refinements in biomedical research 
and data collection have produced growing evidence of the 
deleterious effects of the immediate environment of the fetus 
on its development. The behavioral patterns of the mother during 
gestation and in some instances prior to conception have been 
linked to a variety of congenital disorders ranging from reduced 
IQ and impaired motor coordination to mental retardation, high 
risk of premature births, and in some cases physical deformation 
or prenatal death(Ericson, 45). Although the causal nature 
of these environmental factors in many cases remains tentative 
and inconclusive the evidence of fetal damage resulting from 
the behavior of the mother is mounting. 
During the first eight weeks of gestation, the cells of 
the embryo develop into tissues and organs. This process can 
be interepted by a variety of agents. It is not known precisely 
to what extent congenital malformations (teratogenesis) are 
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due to (1) genetic damage, (2) tissue injury in the developing 
embryo, (3) a combination of these two factors, or (4) 
environment interaction manifested only in those persons 
genetically susceptible, but evidence of the teratogenic effects 
of a variety of drugs is growing(Ericson, 47). While thalidomide 
is the most conclusive and obvious example, other drugs, 
including the widely prescribed Valium, are suspected. 
Nonmedical drugs such as caffeine, nicotine, and marijuana are 
also suspected, although causal evidence is limited in most 
cases. In other cases, however, such as alcohol consumption, 
the data are more conclusive. Also, studies indicate that many 
of the more than half million chemicals that now abound in our 
environment, as well as direct radiation from x-rays and other 
sources, cause chromosomal damage. LSD, cyclamates, methyl 
mercury, benzene, and vinyl chloride exposure, among others, 
have been linked to human chromosomal aberrations(Ericson, 47). 
There is a risk that any drug ingested by a pregnant woman 
will cross the placenta and enter the bloodstream of the 
vulnerable fetus. The belief that the placenta is a barrier 
protecting the fetus from chemicals in the mother's blood was 
tragically disproved in the early 1960s by the occurrence in 
many countries of children born with limbs missing or arrested 
in development after their mothers took the sedative 
thalidomide(Blank, Redefining, 132). In 1955, an outbreak of 
congenital cerebral palsy in Japan was found to be due to the 
eating by pregnant women of fish contaminated with the industrial 
chemical methylmercury. Lead chloroform are two other industrial 
pollutants that cause birth defects by affecting sex cells; 
more are under investigation(Blank, Redefining, 132). Even 
if the mother has built up immunities to particular drugs, the 
fetus does not have similar protection. The fetus appears 
especially susceptible to danger early in gestation when it 
"is a rapidly proliferating and highly differentiating organism, 
constantly changing in size, cell type, percentage of cells 
in mitosis, length of cell cycle, dependence on the maternal 
organism, and ability to replace dead cells"(Blank, Redefining, 
133). 
Approximately one in ten births defects is the result of 
an external agent, such as infection, radiation, mutagenic 
chemicals, or diabetes in the mother(Bayer, 15). For example, 
the most widely known infection to affect the fetus is rubella, 
or German measles. Many women who contract this disease in 
the first three months of pregnancy bear children who have 
abnormal sight or hearing or are mentally handicapped. 
Vaccination of girls during childhood or adolescence can prevent 
this infection. Venereal diseases in the mother can also damage 
the fetus. The effects of radiation were demonstrated by the 
increased incidence of birth defects in the offspring of pregnant 
Japanese women who were exposed to the atomic bomb and of 
American women who underwent radiation therapy while 
pregnant (Bayer, 15). 
In order to focus attention on that environmental factor 
which is largely controllable by the mother, the discussion 
-here focuses on maternal behavioral habits that have been linked 
to fetal alcohol syndrome. 
Although concern over the adverse effects of maternal 
alcohol consumption on the developing fetus can be traced back 
to ancient precedents, it was not until 1973 that researchers 
were able to delineate a recognizable pattern of fetal 
abnormalities associated with chronic maternal alcoholism(Warner, 
1396). Extensive animal experiments and scores of affected 
children reported on left little doubt of the reality and origin 
of this disorder. The fetal alcohol syndrome, here after refered 
to as FAS, has since received considerable attention and effort 
now is being directed at better understanding the sources of 
variability in the effect of alcohol consumption and timing 
on the fetus. Based on a survey of recent literature, FAS 
appears to be the most frequent known teratogenic cause of mental 
deficiency in the western world. Chernoff notes that findings 
about FAS are especially significant because of the magnitude 
of alcohol abuse in the western world and they have, therefore, 
motivated these further research efforts(Blank, Redefining, 
173). 
According to Clarren and Smith malformation patterns of 
FAS can be placed in four major groups: (1) distinctive facial 
features, (2) central nervous system dysfunction, (3) growth 
retardation, and (4) associated physical abnormalities(Clarren, 
Recognition, 2436). According to Jones 43 percent of infants 
born to chronic alcoholics might have significant structural 
malformations(999). Mental retardation has been one of the 
most common and serious problems associated with ethanol 
teratogenicity. Chernoff notes that FAS is the third most 
commonly recognized cause of mental retardation, exceeded only 
by Downs syndrome and neural tube defects(Blank, Redefining, 
173). There is a rather typical facial appearance in persons 
with the fetal alcohol syndrome. Although many disorders feature 
mental deficiency and structural malformation, it is the facial 
similarities among children with the syndrome that unite them 
into a discernible enity. 
In addition to the striking facial appearance of FAS 
children, growth deficiency, both gestationally and postnatally, 
is common, resulting in a "failure to thrive"(Enloe, 12). Most 
infants with the fetal alcohol syndrome are growth deficient 
at birth for both length and weight. Growth in head circumference 
is below normal and mental retardation, ranging from minor 
deficiencies to severe retardation is heightened(Clarren, Brain, 
65). Nurologic abnormalities may be present from birth in 
affected children, again reflecting the prenatal nature of this 
condition. Poor coordination, hyperactive behavior, and tremors 
are also commonly reported in FAS babies. Hyperactivity is 
also a frequent component of the FAS in young children(Barrison, 
16). It should be noted, however, that not all of the offspring 
even of chronic alcoholics display these problems. Also, there 
are numerous instances of children born with only partial 
manifestations of FAS, especially to mothers who drink at lesser 
levels. 
Although progeny of chronic alcoholics are at highest risk 
to manifest extreme FAS characteristics, considerably lesser 
~ 
maternal alcoholic intake is also linked to a variety of fetal 
problems. For instance, a major human study found that 43 
percent of the offspring of chronic alcoholic women have features 
of FAS(Brody, A1). However, consumption of as little as one 
ounce of absolute alcohol per day results in 11 percent of the 
offspring exhibiting FAS features. At consumption levels above 
two ounces this increased to 19 percent(Brody, A1). Because 
these latter two categories represent a substantially larger 
proportion of the population than the chronic alcoholics, 
prevention of FAS requires considerably more understanding of 
the effect of these lower consumption levels on the fetus. 
In response to these data, the Food and Drug Administration 
in 1977 announced that while six drinks per day is sufficient 
cause to establish a major risk to the fetus, as litte as two 
drinks per day could increase the risk of abnormal fetal growth 
and performance(Hanson, Effects, 32). According to Hanson, 
no safe level of maternal alcohol intake during pregnancy has 
been established(Hanson, Reproductive, 67). Until it is, an 
overwhelming number of experts are recommending that women 
abstain from alcohol during pregnancy. Not surprisingly, 
alcoholic beverages now carry the following warning, "According 
to the surgeon general, women should not drink alcoholic 
beverages during pregnancy because of the risk of birth 
defects"(U.S.Dept., Surgeon, 1). 
There is a complicating factor, however, concerning maternal 
alcohol consumption. Crucial but yet preliminary evidence 
relates to the timing of exposure to alcohol. In their study 
-. 
of the effect found that the consumption level in the first 
month of pregnancy was a better predictor of fetal outcomes 
than amounts consumed later in the pregnancy. 
This result is not unexpected as a knowledge 
of embryology would predict that in order to 
produce major abnormalities of morphogenesis, 
prenatal insults to development must occur 
relatively early(Cooper, 225). 
Despite this evidence, however, it should not be assumed that 
alcohol consumption during the later stages of pregnancy is 
safe. Brain growth as well as the growth of other organ systems 
proceeds throughout pregnancy and might be effected by maternal 
alcohol consumption late into the pregnancy. 
The data that point to the critical early stages as the 
danger period for major central nervous system malformations 
caused by maternal alcohol abuse, however, are devastating for 
efforts at preventing FAS, since they imply that FAS is far 
along before most women are even aware of their pregnancy. 
By the time the women knows she is pregnant, damage may have 
already taken place and it is already too late to avert the 
most severe malformations. This means that "even with full 
knowledge of the syndrome, some women not contemplating pregnancy 
will conceive and expose their developing embryo to high blood 
alcohol levels during critical stages of development"(Clarren, 
Facial, 665). 
What is required, therefore, for the prevention of FAS 
is to "have all women of childbearing age who are not practicing 
contraception modify their drinking habits to be compatible 
with normal prenatal development"(Little, 254). Obviously, 
--
this is an unlikely possibility in western society even if 
considerably more funds are spent on public education efforts. 
Given the aggregation of evidence demonstrating the deleterious 
effect of alcohol consumption of fetal development, however, 
it is certain that significantly greater attention will be 
directed toward the responsibility of the mother to provide 
an alcohol-free environment for her developing fetus. But 
consideration of preventive actions must be delayed. We must 
now turn our attention to the political rights of the fetus 
if we are to understand the larger issues at hand. 
Initially, then, it is necessary to understand how the 
legal system conceptualizes the fetus if we are to understand 
how it treats FAS affected babies. Although our legal system 
historically has treated the fetus as part of the woman bearing 
it and has afforded it no rights as an entity separate from 
her, with the exceptions necessary to protect the interests 
of born individuals, recently, without any fundamental revision 
of Roe, fetuses have been granted rights based on the view that 
the fetus has interests that are potentially hostile to the 
pregnant woman's(Sabatini, 996). The scope of these rights 
is evolving. For example, most states, now consider fetuses 
that have died in utero to be "persons"(Blank, Biomedical, 66). 
Growth in fetal rights, even in the context of women's 
privacy right to abortion, may constrain what women may agree 
to and what researchers may do in the area of fetal research. 
The most dramatic reformulation of fetal research policy, 
however, might have followed the Supreme Court ruling in Webster 
-vs. Reproductive Health Services(Blank, Biomedical, 65). Among 
other issues, was the Missouri law's preamble, declaring that 
it is state policy that "the life of each human being begins 
at conception," and defines the conceptus, and thereby embryo 
and fetus, as a person in terms of the Constitution(Blank, 
Biomedical, 66). In this instance, the Court did not decide 
on the issue, but the selection of such a case indicates that 
a decesion may not be to distant. We can speculate that if 
a positive decesion had been rendered an emphasis on research 
remedying fetal defects would become more pressing. 
This emphasis on fetal defects raises questions concerning 
prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion of those fetuses 
affected with FAS. The "right to be born healthy,". say Murphy, 
Chase, and Rodriquez, is misleading because it actually means 
that "only healthy persons have a right to be born"(Murphy, 
81). To Alexander Capron, the recognition of an enforceable 
right to be born with a sound, normal mind and body would "open 
the door to judicially mediated intervention of limitless 
dimensions"(124). For many of those affected, the choice is 
not between a healthy and unhealthy existence, but rather between 
an unhealthy existence and none at all. Thus it is evident 
that the legal protection afforded to a new born may be invalid 
for many FAS affected fetuses. 
The concepts of rights and responsibilities are, of course, 
closely intertwined for both the fetus and the mother. The 
responsibility to affected persons can relate either to those 
presently living with the FAS or potential persons who would 
be affected if they are born. It seems that the responsibility 
toward those already living is to protect their well-being and 
to provide all possible means of minimizing their problems(Annas, 
16). The responsibility toward the yet unborn persons is much 
less clear and fraught with dilemma. Certainly, there is a 
societal responsibility to reduce the probability of anyone 
individual being affected by FAS. Does this mean, however, 
that coercive measures shoiuld be employed when voluntary 
compliance to proper prenatal behavior fails? Perhaps the most 
foreboding aspect of allowing increased state involvement in 
pregnant women's lives in the name of the fetus is that the 
state may impose direct injunctive regulation of women's 
activities. For many, "the notion of sanctions during pregnancy 
is an unjustified limitation on personal liberty"(Robertson, 
27) • 
Responsibility to affected persons becomes even more 
ambivalent when discussing screening of women at greater risk 
of producing a FAS child. Implicit in such an argument would 
be the sacrifice that might result if the women at greatest 
risk were not allowed to reproduce. In other words, once one 
focuses on potential affected persons, a dilemma arises in that 
probability dictates that any action taken to eliminate the 
"at risk women" will affect a larger number of potentially 
healthy than unhealthy children(Blank, Biological, 170). On 
this basis alone, without taking into consideration the rights 
of the women, compulsory screening of at risk women and its 
logical extension of prohibiting procreation in such instances 
would be illogical on public health grounds(Blank, Biological, 
171). Obviously, this does not preclude the screening of 
potentially at risk women on voluntary grounds or even the 
justification of mandatory screening on some broader 
responsibility. In fact, Robertson and Schulman note that "legal 
requirements for a registry and counseling would not be an 
unethical intrusion on privacy"(26). 
The recognition that government regulation of maternal/fetal 
regulations infringes upon maternal privacy rights represents 
only one side of the constitutional balance. Under strict 
scrutiny, courts must also determine whether and when the state 
interests that lie on the other side become compelling(Sabatini, 
1003). Among the broad state interests that could be offered 
to justify criminal fetal abuse statutes are the protection 
of fetuses from the risk of miscarriage or still birth and the 
protection of fetuses from the risk of birth defects caused 
by prenatal injury(Sabatini, 1004). These state interests could 
be legitimate either as an outgrowth of the state's power to 
protect potential life, discussed in Roe, or as an extension 
of its ability to protect born persons. The fact that a born 
child may suffer as a result of fetal abuse adds to the state's 
interest. As a logical matter, the strength of the state 
interest in preventing any particular maternal activity depends 
on the likelihood that the activity will lead to harm and the 
significance of such harm to the fetus or the born child. 
Since the Roe decision, the law increasingly has recognized 
the fetus in contexts that are not contingent upon subsequent 
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live birth. The creation of fetal rights not contingent upon 
subsequent live birth reflects a legitimate desire to protect 
the rights of the pregnant woman and the expectant father. 
Recognizing fetuses in wrongful death actions serves to 
compensate parents for the loss of their expected child and 
to protect the interests of a woman who has chosen to carry 
her pregnancy to term. Such recognition also seeks to deter 
and punish the tortious conduct. Similarly, feticide laws use 
the criminal law to protect pregnant women from physical attack 
and from the harm of having their pregnancies involuntarily 
and violently terminated by third parties responsible for the 
negligent or criminal destruction of fetuses is therefore 
consistent with, and even enhances, the protection of pregnant 
women's interests. 
Yet the form that this legal recognition often takes creates 
the potential for the future expansion of fetal rights in ways 
that conflict with women's interests. By sometimes identifying 
the fetus rather than the woman as the locus of the right when 
there is no live birth, recent laws have reflected a more 
expansive view for FAS affected babies. The law no longer 
recognizes the fetus only in those cases where it is necessary 
to protect the interests of the subsequently born child and 
her or his parents. Rather, the law has conferred rights upon 
the fetus itself. Conceptualizing the fetus as an entity with 
legal rights independent of the pregnant woman has made possible 
the future creation of fetal rights that could be used against 
the pregnant woman who abuses alcohol during early gestation. 
-In Grodin v. Grodin, a Michigan court held that a child 
could sue his mother for taking tetracycline during her 
pregnancy, allegedly resulting in the discoloration of the 
child's teeth. The court stated that the appropriate standard 
for liability was that of the "reasonable" pregnant 
woman(Johnsen, 604). Another court hearing, Curlender v. 
Bio-Science Laboratories, has suggested that a woman may be 
sued by her child for not preventing its birth if she had prior 
knowledge of the probability of its being born 
"defective II (Johnsen, 604). In some states, a woman can be 
deprived of custody of her child even before its birth if the 
state feels that her actions during pregnancy endanger the fetus. 
In Michigan, a state whose laws do not expressly extend to 
IIprenatal abuse," a court held that evidence of a woman's 
IIprenatal abuse,1I a court held that evidence of a woman's 
prenatal lIabuse ll or IIneglect ll could be considered during 
proceedings instituted by the state to deprive her of custody 
of her newborn child. California's criminal child abuse statute, 
which requires a parent lito furnish necessary food, clothing, 
shelter or medical attendance,1I extends to fetuses and imposes 
a criminal penalty of up to one year in jail and a two thousand 
dollar fine(Johnsen, 605). 
The conclusions one can draw from the disparate legal 
treatment of fetuses are limited. To some extent, through live-
birth and viability requirements and nonenforcement of criminal 
statutes, states have evinced a lesser interest in protecting 
fetuses from harm than they have in protecting the born. Thus 
,- the treatment of fetal injuries in other areas of law provides 
some support for the proposition that a state's interest in 
preventing fetal abuse is less compelling than its interest 
in protecting a child from post-natal harm. It is difficult 
to say more, however, because current law primarily addresses 
harms that nonmaterial third parties inflict, which are easily 
distinguishable in constitutional terms from maternally inflicted 
harms. However, the state's interest may be trumped by a privacy 
right when maternal conduct is in question. In short, other 
areas of the law provide little guidance, and there is some 
leeway in the weight that a state may assign to fetal interests. 
In addition to consideration of the rights of affected 
persons, society must provide parents or prospective parents 
with adequate information upon which to make informed decisions. 
At some point, consensus must define if and when responsibility 
to the affected persons takes precedence over the rights of 
the parents to have or not to have children. This question 
without doubt is a difficult and sensitive one, and any 
determination of the boundary between maternal rights and 
responsibility and concern for the affected person is bound 
to be controversial. Consequently, it is doubtful that any 
solution will be forthcoming. The extent to which society is 
bound to overrule the right to procreate in order to protect 
those affected or potentially affected by FAS, however, will 
be an evermore crucial question as more is understood about 
the variables of volume of alcohol consumption and timing on 
the fetus(Feinberg, 132). Obviously, the rights of the mothers 
and those of their affected offspring will not always be at 
odds. Given the pluralistic value system in the United states, 
however, conflict is bound to be common, nevertheless. 
In addition to the duty of society to minimize its 
interference in the decisions of individuals to reproduce as 
they desire there are other concerns relating to responsibility 
towards individual citizens. Opposition to selective abortion 
on moral or religious grounds is intense and sincere and cannot 
be ignored as a central aspect in establishing any "at risk" 
intervention programs. Since most prenatal diagnosis techniques 
and goals center on therapeutic abortion as an alternative to 
carrying a diagnosed defective fetus to term, amniocentesis 
has become a target of those groups concerned with the right 
to life(Feinberg, 133). Any societal decision must take account 
of these moral dilemmas raised by intervention in the life 
process. 
Additional areas of concern relate to individual perogatives 
to privacy in the procreative process. Criticisms of 
amniocentesis as an invasion of privacy are strongly held by 
many, despite a general societal acceptance of the objectives 
of that technique(Murphy, 109). Questions relating to 
stigmatization of couples who choose to have children despite 
the high risk for their offspring and those who reject prenatal 
diagnosis or therapeutic abortion as alternatives must also 
be examined. Responsibility to parents as citizens with certain 
childbearing freedoms must be emphasized, although it cannot 
be the only consideration in any policy decision. 
statutes designed to prevent fetal harm could affect a 
wide range of personal decisions. Almost any decision that 
a pregnant woman makes with respect to her own body, in this 
instance drinking, may injure a fetus and thus take on legal 
significance if fetal abuse is criminalized. Regulation of 
such activities implicates the right to privacy in reproductive 
decision making first articulated in Griswold v. 
Connecticut(Sabatini, 999). The Griswold Court, in striking 
down a Connecticut law that prohibited married couples from 
using contraceptive devices, recognized that certain intimate 
decisions deserve constitutional protection. Later cases built 
on Griswold to rein~orce an understanding of this privacy right 
as the right to make decisions within the familial and 
procreative spheres, free from state interference. 
This right of the individual to control procreative and 
familial decisions should also apply to the maternal decisions 
potentially infringed upon by fetal abuse legislation. The 
decisions in question here when not to drink, when to go 
to the doctor, whether to have sex, and so forth -- have both 
procreative and nonprocreative aspects. Indeed, regulating 
such decisions for all people -- for example, banning all alcohol 
consumption has no procreative significance. If states limit 
consumption only for pregnant women, however, they would be 
regulating the procreative aspect of the decision whether to 
drink. Such laws seek to control the incidents of procreation, 
infringing on a woman's power to make decisions about how she 
will live her life during her pregnancy. 
-. 
Broad fetal abuse statues that are patterned on child abuse 
statutes -- those that make neglecting or abusing a fetus a 
crime without specifying what constitutes neglect or abuse -
-may be constitutional for two reasons. First, such statutes 
would be void for vagueness because they do not define the 
specific forms of abuse that constitute crimes and thus would 
not give notice to mothers of the scope of their duties toward 
their fetuses(Johnsen, 606). Second, such statutes could be 
interpreted to require a degree of infringement on maternal 
rights not justified by the extent of fetal protection they 
offer; thus they would not be narrowly tailored enough to survive 
statute that included fetuses could be interpreted to punish 
the taking of drugs that are essential to the mother's health 
but harmful to the fetus. This result stands in opposition 
to the standard articulated in the abortion cases -- that 
concerns for maternal health constitutionally outweigh concerns 
for fetal health throughout pregnancy. 
When applied to narrower statutes targeted at specific 
conduct, strict scrutiny yields less obvious results. Statutes 
banning specific types of conduct by pregnant women would not 
fail for vagueness as would the broad statutes discussed above. 
Under a strict scrutiny standard, the state has the burden of 
establishing that the banned maternal activity bears a clear 
relation to significant fetal harm and that banning the activity 
is not an over-encompassing means of protecting the fetus from 
that harm(Johnsen, 613). The following factors should bear 
on how much weight courts should assign to both the maternal 
and state interests. First, because the rights of both 
procreative privacy and bodily integrity are justified by 
reference to tradition, the maternal right to decide should 
be given more weight when the decision is one traditionally 
accorded to the individual. Second, as discussed above, the 
state's interest becomes stronger as the likelihood increases 
that the banned activity will lead to harm and as the harm 
becomes more significant(Johnsen, 614). 
Gustafson argues that the "major persisting matter of moral 
choice is whether preference should be given to the individual 
or the community"(529). There are many ways in which this 
tension between individuals and society can be stated. One 
can talk about rights of the individual v. costs or benefits 
to the community; or the rights of the human race to survive 
v. the rights of a mother to bear a defective child. Whatever 
the distinction, most resolutions of fetal abuse dilemmas center 
on this conflict between the mothers reproductive rights and 
the fetuses right to be born healthy. Rights of individuals 
must be weighed against the rights of society. Callahan sees 
little chance of a happy balance and contends that all solutions 
are bound to be only temporary(265). 
Flectcher sees the conflict reduced basically to a sanctity-
of-life v. a quality-of-life ethics, and he opts for the latter. 
His "situati.onal ethics" places emphasis directly on the 
principle of proportionate good(75). He contends that one must 
attempt to compute the gains and loses which would follow from 
several possible courses of action (or nonaction) and then choose 
the one which offers the most good. The common welfare has 
to be safeguarded by compulsory control if necessary, according 
to Fletcher: "Ideally it is better to do the moral thing freely, 
but sometimes it is more compassionate to force it to be done 
than to sacrifice the well-being of the many to the egocentric 
rights of the few"(76). Fletcher favors compulsory controls 
on reproduction if they are needed to promote the greatest good 
for the largest number. 
Taking an opposing position, Beecher argues that society 
exists to serve man and not vice versa(249). Therefore, 
individuals have certain inalienable rights which cannot be 
taken from them by the state. Paul Ramsey contends that 
"parenthood is certainly one of those 'courses of action' natural 
to man, which cannot without violation be dissembled and put 
together again ••• "(109). The threat to the autonomy of the 
pregnant woman would therefore out weigh any state regulation. 
Indeed, this position would consider reproductive rights to 
be inalienable and beyond state authority. 
Through a long series of rulings, the courts have 
consistently interpreted the right to life as including an 
inherent claim of citizens to health care and to a free choice 
in making health decisions. When rights and the common good 
conflict, the individual's claims to health care generally has 
taken precedence. Within the context of expanded technological 
possibilities and the accompanying costs, attention now has 
shifted to determining what, if any, limits should be placed 
on claims upon society by individuals for health care(Little, 
257). 
Americans I preference for curative over preventive medicine 
has been well documented. This orientation is reinforced by 
the emphasis on the technological fix, the hesitancy to interfere 
with individual lifestyle choice, and the powerful momentum 
of the medical research community(Blank, Life, 137). Moreover, 
the medical profession has pursued the search for cures to 
disease more vigorously than ways to prevent disease. Often, 
however, the advanced technologies it develops are supportive 
rather than curative; that is, instead of curing a disease, 
they preserve a particular level of personal health by creating 
a continual dependence on further medical treatment. Evidence 
suggests that the most significant improvements in health have 
come from preventive, not curative or supportive, medicine even 
though these latter efforts are the most dramatic and, therefore, 
most easily funded(U.S.Dept., Health, 28). Most advances in 
preventive area, in turn, have come from areas outside medicine, 
primarily in improved sanitation, nutrition, housing, and 
education. 
Although many proposed preventive efforts may not be cost-
effective, \~hen well planned and executed preventive medicine 
can provide a high return on its investment. Conversely, 
curative medicine is often of questionable utility, particularly 
near the end of the life cycle(U.S.Dept., Health, 29). Here 
again, though, society's obsession with prolonging life forces 
us to invest huge amounts of scarce health dollars in a quest 
to extend life even if only for a short time. Moreover, often 
.-
-
the life we are saving is of low quality, spent attached to 
various tubE!s and machines in a sanitized hospital setting. 
The recent growth of hospice care and the frequent refusal of 
these heroic lifesaving measures represent a repudiation of 
the high-technology extensions of life that have become a major 
aspect of our "health" care system(Little, 266). 
The most difficult policy alternative for the prevention 
of FAS affected children is preventive behavior. Attempts by 
the government to intervene in lifestyle decisions are inherently 
controversial. For instance, laws requiring motorcyclists to 
wear safety helments have been attacked as paternalistic, 
unwarranted governmental interference in behavior that does 
not threaten the health of others(Blank, Life, 138). Many 
lifestyle mandates have been either rejected by the courts as 
violations of individual autonomy or rescinded by legislatures 
under constituency pressure. Nevertheless, pressures emerging 
from the coming health-care crisis demand that we consider much 
more closely (1) the role individuals play in contributing to 
their offsprings health problems, (2) a shift of responsibility 
for health toward the individual, and (3) a renewed emphasis 
on individuals' obligations to society to do those things that 
maximize health(Little, 267). 
Although I hesitate to state that FAS has any positive 
aspects, it does provide several crucial lessons that might 
ultimately help design a more rational health policy. First, 
because no technological fix has been forthcoming, FAS clearly 
shifts emphasis to a preventive strategy. More than any other 
disorder, it demonstrates how intimately individual behavior 
is related to health. It also illuminates how changes in 
behavior can substantially reduce the existence of such an 
unnessary affliction. 
This thesis began by pointing out the somewhat susceptible 
nature of the fetal environment. It is because of this 
susceptibility that the concern for fetuses has grown in the 
last twenty years, through new biomedical research and through 
decisions of the courts invigorating both statutes and the 
constitution. But susceptibility is not a one-way proposition. 
We can percE~ive, that society's interest in protecting the fetal 
environment from the harmful effects of alcohol may conflict 
with a mother's civil liberties. Clearly, a woman's right to 
bodily autonomy in matters concerning reproduction is protected 
by the constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy. Society 
should assume a prenatal role in protecting those fetuses that 
come to term. In this regard, voluntary compliance to proper 
prenatal behavior represents the superior route to harmonize 
each parties interests'. 
In conclusion, we are compelled to ask, Are objections 
to fetal protection based on technical, medical, or political 
grounds? This question is the most critical one for determining 
fetal protection policy in the 1990s as well as for sorting 
out theoretical relationships. If fetal protection is solely 
a technical issue, then creation of some sort of bias-free 
statutes should quiet the debate and produce some consensus 
on perceptions of justice. If it is a combination of technical, 
.-
medical, and political issues, the debate will probably rage 
on, with each side invoking justice rhetoric as a powerful tool 
to gain support. Because no definitive tests or absolute 
standards exist, the ultimate definition of fairness in fetal 
abuse policy depends upon consensus between the biomedical 
research and the congressional-judicial communities. 
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